The Power of the Gift and the New Aid Modalities by Eyben, Rosalind
1 Introduction
This article looks at official international aid through
the conceptual lenses of gift theory, with a case study
of how the power of the gift shapes the meanings
and social practices of aid, including the new aid
modalities that involve budget support rather than
projects. In so doing, I draw on Bourdieu’s argument
that social actors draw on the vocabulary of one set
of rules and norms to explain a social practice that
follows quite different principles, principles that they
conceal even from themselves, while at the same
time having practical (tacit or unexamined) knowledge
as to how to follow these (Bourdieu 1990). My aim is
to reveal to such practitioners that they are following
the principles of the giving and receiving of gifts,
albeit they couch their behaviour in terms of either
exchanging contracts or delivering/demanding
entitlements. I suggest they do this because this
allows them to evade a conscious scrutiny of the
operations of power in aid relationships. Further
building on Bourdieu, I shall suggest that the aid
relationship typifies his comment that:
In our societies, and at the very heart of the
economic economy, we still find the logic of
symbolic goods and the alchemy which
transforms the truth of relations of domination, in
paternalism. (Bourdieu 1998: 101)
Quite simply, my premise is that if donors and
recipients were able to be more aware of what they
are really doing in the practice of aid, including above
all, recognising how power shapes the aid
relationship, there might be more of a chance of the
good intentions of aid, as manifested in campaigns
such as ‘Make Poverty History’, making more of a
real difference in the lives of those that international
aid claims to help.
In two earlier pieces on power and relations in
international aid, I have proposed that international
aid can be variously understood as a contract, an
entitlement or a gift. In explaining any specific case of
giving and receiving aid, while I have suggested that
all three concepts have explanatory utility, I have
pointed out that those involved are likely to differ in
their own explicit or tacit conceptual understandings
of what aid is. These differences will be reflected in
disagreement concerning the content and purpose
of any aid relationship, including the normative
(values and beliefs) and the procedural aspects of aid
arrangements (Eyben 2005; Eyben with León 2005).
Today, official donors (governments and multilateral
organisations) are increasingly designing instruments
that make aid appear like an economic contractually
binding agreement. This is because the new aid
modalities are often mediated through an
international financial institution (IFI) that thinks like a
bank, while not always behaving like one. In many aid-
dependent countries, bilateral donors are moving
from designing and managing standalone projects to
associating with such IFIs for providing budget
support to recipient governments. Although the
bilateral agencies concerned will be contributing
grants, the whole arrangement is understood by the
IFI, for example the World Bank, as a loan and the
procedures associated with it are not entirely
dissimilar from those associated with the loan we
might get from the high street branch of our local
bank for setting up a small business or buying a house.
On the other hand, many citizens and their
governments in recipient countries – supported by
those in donor agencies promoting rights-based
approaches – prefer to see aid as an entitlement, to
which they understand people in developing
countries have a claim within the international
human rights framework. Such an understanding has
been resisted by donor countries during interminable
debates over the Declaration of the Right to
Development (Piron 2002). Then again, recent
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moves by the same donors towards mutual
accountability and stronger recipient country
ownership, as expressed in the recent Paris
Declaration on Effective Aid (2005) could be
interpreted as part of a shift in international aid to
rights-based approaches, despite official resistance to
the Right to Development (Eyben 2003).1
Thus for both official donors and recipients, aid is
primarily conceptualised, with its associated rules and
norms, as either an economic contract or an
entitlement. Aid conceived as a gift has few friends in
the official world of aid but it is attractive to
anthropologists studying aid because it appears to
illuminate what may be actually happening as distinct
from what people say they are doing. So far, such
studies have focused on the non-governmental
sector, where ideas of philanthropy and charitable
giving are much stronger than in official aid circles.
Stirrat and Henkel (1997) look at how a gift of
money from a private donor in the North moves
through a chain of non-governmental organisation
(NGO) relationships until it reaches its ultimate
recipient. Drawing on the classic on gift theory by
the French sociologist, Marcel Mauss, Stirrat and
Henkel argue that while the money flows one way,
symbolic reciprocity moves up the chain the other
way. Most notably, they propose that while the gift is
understood by the donor as an expression of social
solidarity and the way it is given attempts to deny
difference between the donor and the recipient, a
gift in practice reinforces or even reinvents these
differences (Stirrat and Henkel 1997). Sampson
(2002) writes in a similar vein about the chain of
giving and receiving, in which it is always the giver
who has the power, stressing that there is no such
thing as a free gift.
In an interesting article from an international
relations perspective, Hattori takes this argument
further and proposes that official government-to-
government aid is also a gift. Drawing on Bourdieu’s
ideas of symbolic domination, he suggests that in
providing the gift of aid – which, because of
equivalent lack of resources recipients cannot
reciprocate – donors are able to reinforce their
material and political dominance while disguising this
as a generous gesture. Out of need, the recipients
have no choice but to accept, and they therefore
become complicit in the reproduction of the status
quo that allows the donors to give aid in the first
place (2001).
Hattori deploys gift theory to explore power
relations within the global political economy. In
contrast, I am interested in how aid relationships play
out in a particular local context where those
representing organisations with a global span
struggle to connect with the cultural construction of
power in the recipient country. I draw on my time as
an aid practitioner in Bolivia to explore that question,
including reflecting on my personal experience of
power in the aid relationship, now querying how I
could have behaved otherwise. From an early age, I
had wanted to be an applied anthropologist, in order
to do good in the world. I am still learning how
power in all its disguises can feed on such ambition
and convert good intentions to poor outcomes.2
The article is structured as follows. In the next
section, I explore anthropological theories of the gift
and their relevance for illuminating the operations of
power in aid relations. This is followed by a reflexive
account of my work in Bolivia with an illustration of
how the power of the gift played out in the social
practices relating to a programme of budgetary
support. I conclude the article by suggesting that
explicitly designing aid instruments as gifts might
make aid more effective in promoting a social justice
agenda than do the current aid modalities.
2 Gifts, entitlements and contracts
2.1 What is a gift?
There is no consensus as to what a gift is. If a gift is
understood as a means of commodity exchange that
was economic practice before the invention of
money, its reciprocal character is emphasised. Thus,
there is no such thing as a free gift. Every gift
expects a return, even if the return is symbolic in
character, or in the language of neoclassical
economics, the giver chooses to optimise his
preference for altruism. A gift understood in this way
is not a gift but just a particular kind of exchange
within the universal market in which all human
interactions (transactions) take place. It can be
distinguished from other forms of economic
exchange by the lack of bargaining over equivalent
value, the willingness of the giver to wait for some
time before receiving a gift in return and by the
absence of a formal legal contract.
While some sociologists and economists have
applied rational choice theory to social exchange in
which the focus is on the individual actor and where
both giver and receiver seek to get as good they give
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(Carrier 1996), most anthropologists are more
interested in the gift as an expression of a
relationship. This is because it brings to the fore
notions of power and morality that shape its
character. This is overlooked in rational choice theory
that is based on the metaphor of the impersonal
level playing field of the market (Mirowski 2001).
Thus, following the French tradition that originated
with Durkheim and Mauss – and is currently
exemplified in British anthropology by Strathern
(1994) – I understand a gift as a material expression
of a social relationship.
Post-modernism and feminism have favoured the
return of the gift as a subject for academic
consideration. Post-modernists appreciate its
ambiguity and its potential to make positivist
economists feel uncomfortable. They like its capacity
to create an epistemic tremor, that is, to shake our
convictions that we know how the world is
structured (Callari 2002). Feminist studies have
rescued the gift from its residual function as social
glue – women’s matters – in a world run according
to the dictates of the market (Strathern 1994). The
gift privileges relationships over transactions.
Mauss proposed that the ambiguity of the gift
relationship is that it is at one and the same time
interested and disinterested. A gift always has an
intention behind it – and is therefore interested. On
the other hand, if the intention is moral or sacred,
then it is also disinterested. The giver sees himself as
a vehicle or intermediary in the delivery of a gift
from God. Thus, the giver should not be thanked
because he has no interest in the gift. When gifts are
seen as sacred it is bad manners to express gratitude
to the human intermediary (Appadurai 1985). Along
the same lines, when I was a representative of a
donor agency, I disliked being thanked personally
when authorising an aid expenditure. It implied there
was a personal interest, whereas I wanted it to be
understood that like Appadurai’s religious devotee
acting on behalf of God, I was simply acting on
behalf of the taxpayer. It goes without saying that
my actual motives and feelings were much more
confused than such an outward expression of civil
servant conformity would indicate. David Mosse,3 of
the School of Oriental and African Studies,
commented that when a donor representative visits
a beneficiary community he is welcomed with
ceremony and offered gifts but the economic
benefit that the aid agency staff member gets out of
the relationship – through his salary – is very much
higher than any benefit an individual villager will get
from the well or school building.
Gifts have a further ambiguity. As an expression of
the sacred and/or the moral, a gift is a recognition of
a social bond between giver and receiver, but that
same recognition can be imbued with sentiments of
power and even aggression. While both sides might
want the relationship, of which the gift is the
expression, in circumstances when one party – the
donor – has more economic and symbolic resources
than the other party, it is possible that the donor can
pick and choose among his recipients, withdrawing
his favours and transferring to another, without the
abandoned recipient having any right of redress.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the receiver with
fewer resources than the donor may find himself in a
position of accepting a gift which he cannot refuse
(Callari 2002; Amariglio 2002). The power of the
gift is that by accepting it, the recipient is not only
taking the money but in so doing is acknowledging
and reconfirming the relationship. This is the shadow
side of the gift, commonly described as clientelism –
that very system that aid agencies are seeking to
eradicate through their good governance agendas.
As I shall now discuss, this dissonance between
theory and practice explains why conceptualising aid
as a gift has few friends in the world of donors and
recipients.
2.2 The gift has few friends in the world of aid
The problem with the gift in a world of aid
administered by bureaucracies is that it appears
pre-modern, a patrimonial relic from a time when
transactions were thought to be not efficiently
impersonal but dependent on the quality of the
relationship. For those committed to the
development enterprise of spreading modernism and
capitalism throughout the world gift exchange, as
they understand it practised in primitive economies,
was embedded in social relationships that constrained
and limited the potential for individual enterprise.
The idea of the gift thus contradicts the idea of
development, that is of a country or region
progressing through various stages until reaching the
‘developed’ market economy maturity of the OECD
countries. Because gift giving is understood by most
economists as possessing a residual non-economic
function in modern societies, when development
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practice, so exceptionally strongly imbued by
economic thinking, looks to the observer very like a
gift relationship, rather than a market transaction, a
process of ‘misrecognition’ is required to make the
gift look like something else.4
Some, such as very liberal economists, do recognise
aid as a gift – charity – and object to it on those
grounds, arguing that foreign direct investment has a
much greater potential to develop the recipient
country than could gifts received from a
development bureaucracy. Those advocating aid,
while generally sympathetic to the above argument,
see aid as a short-term stop-gap that they argue is in
any case, in the self-interest of the donor. It might
look like a gift but it is really a market investment
that brings a return through more people in the
world having the wherewithal to buy the goods that
the donor country produces.5
The alternative, more socially oriented position,
objects to aid as a gift relationship because of the
belief that developing countries are entitled to
receive money from the richer countries. My own
sympathies tend to lie in this direction. Our argument
is usually couched in terms of the international
human rights framework and global citizenship. The
entitlement approach to aid seeks to construct a
system of global governance that manages the global
economy. Based on the thinking of T.H. Marshall
about the national welfare state, social global
citizenship would be achieved through policies of
redistribution such as the Tobin tax. This alternative,
rights-based view strongly dislikes the ‘shadow’ side
of the gift because of its discretionary nature.
Both objections, from what we might call the right
and the left6 of the aid debate (Therien 2002) owe
their origin to Enlightenment liberal thinking
concerning contracts, democracy, rights and individual
autonomy. The Enlightenment looked back at its pre-
capitalist past and saw thick, messy and unjust
relationships in which privilege and patrimony decided
life’s chances. In that unpleasant past, value was not
defined by what the market would pay but by the
power of kings and priests. Wealth was not created
through one’s own effort but depended on a royal
gift. People had no rights; they were subjects rather
than citizens. Thus, development practice, as one of
the most faithful adherents to the Enlightenment
view of the world, is acutely discomforted with the
idea that aid could be viewed as a gift. For
international aid to resonate with its modernist
purpose, it badly needs to relabelled as something
else. This has long been the case with project aid but
such aid appeared more discretionary than the
current favoured arrangements of country ownership.
The problem with projects from this perspective is
that they were largely managed by donors so that
while they appeared to be making a transfer of
resources to the recipient, they were actually still
keeping them. The paradoxical and elusive nature of
the gift challenges the distinction between primary
ownership and possession. It is possible to ‘keep while
giving’ (Osteen 2002: 233, quoting Weiner).
Today’s vision, as expressed in the Paris Declaration
(see above) is one in which the recipient government,
rather than the donor, decides on what to do with
the aid which ideally should be given as budget
support. These new aid modalities can thus, once and
for all, abolish any suspicion that aid might be a gift
and most satisfactorily work for both those who
believe that aid is an entitlement, and those that see
it as an economic contract. However, will these new
modalities be capable of changing power relations or
are they just disguising what continues to be a gift
relationship? In the next section, I explore this
question by drawing on direct experience from my
time working in Bolivia as the head of the UK
Department for International Development (DFID)
country office from 2000–2. I do this by discussing
how some bilateral donors, including DFID, moved
from funding their own standalone projects to
pioneering the new aid agenda of harmonisation,
programmatic/sector aid and budget support through
basket fund arrangements in which their grant aid
was combined with credit from an IFI.
For readers not familiar with aid jargon, ‘harmonisation’
is the process by which donors agree to coordinate
their aid policies and procedures in support of the
recipient’s objectives. ‘Programmatic/ sector aid’ is the
financing of a whole span of activities, for example the
education sector, rather than a location-specific
project. ‘Budget support’ is when the donor gives
money to the recipient to manage rather than hanging
on to the money and managing it through a donor-
controlled project. A ‘basket fund’ is when several
donors put their money together into a single fund
managed by the recipient against a pre-agreed plan
without each donor’s contribution being ear-marked
for specific activities. ‘Grant aid’ is a gift! It is different
from a loan that has to be repaid.
3 The power of the gift in Bolivia
3.1 Personal reflections on power
As already mentioned, one of the illuminating qualities
of gift theory is that it is quintessentially concerned
with relationships and the meanings, values and
emotions that accompany these. It allows us to
explore the impact we have upon each other and how
this shapes possibilities for future action. It helps us
understand aid practices as being much more than the
instruments used or the agreements negotiated. At
the same time, finding out the meanings those
involved give to their actions is not easy, particularly as
Bourdieu points out that through misrecognition,
people may be ignorant of their own practice, dressing
it up as something else. Power operates to encourage
self deception (Chambers 1997).
In seeking to interpret their own understandings of
their practice, I roughly categorise the sets of aid
actors in Bolivia, as follows. As already mentioned, I
suggest that staff in the IFIs – in the case of Bolivia
meaning the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank – understand aid as an economic
contract in which money is lent and returned with
interest, at highly reduced rates for a low-income
country as was Bolivia at that time. On first arriving in
Bolivia, I found the IMF had a reputation for being
both very influential with the country’s President
Banzer (a former military dictator) and entirely
indifferent to poverty reduction, despite the IMF
headquarters having committed itself to the new
poverty reduction strategy process associated with
debt relief.
What I refer to later as ‘like-minded donors’ were
those with whom both my head office and myself as
an individual were friendly, particularly the
Netherlands and Sweden. Early champions of ‘country
ownership’, meaning that recipients rather than
donors should decide on what aid should be spent
(provided it was on what donors wanted it to be spent
on), we believed that aid was an entitlement.
However, we discovered we did not always agree as
to the extent to which it was the recipient
government’s entitlement or the entitlement of the
citizens of the country.7 The recipient government,
particularly the staff in the Ministry of Finance with
whom we had the closest relationship, were also
fervent enthusiasts for country ownership, meaning
particularly the Ministry of Finance rather than other
Ministries, let alone Parliament or citizens, should
decide on how aid was spent. They would also have
liked to see aid as an entitlement; in some cases their
response to the perceived humiliation of having to ask
for support was to act quite ferociously towards staff
from donor agencies.
While most Bolivian academics, NGOs and
representatives of civil society networks that I
encountered and that DFID supported financially, felt
equally humiliated by the country’s aid dependence,
they generally did not express it as openly as did
some of their government compatriots, rather
appearing to slip quite comfortably into clientelistic
relations with donor staff. As I mention later, most
citizens operating within a patronage system of
social and political relations, incorporated donor staff
into that wider system and openly and knowingly
practised aid as a gift relationship.
My illustrative material for what follows is largely
based on some publicly available reports and my
memory, supported by some diary notes, records of
meetings and odd snippets of emails to family and
friends. I seek to write in reflexive mode, that is
entailing critical reflection on my own actions,
feelings and ways of knowing. I try to think myself
back into how I understood what I was doing and
believing in and how I felt when six years ago I
emailed the following to my partner, in relation to
the national consultation process relating to the
development of Bolivia’s donor-inspired Poverty
Reduction Strategy (Eyben 2004):
Although I am sorry that you cannot come earlier
it is just as well because in later July and early
August will be the highlight of the National
Dialogue which gets more and more interesting.
This week I have been busy networking trying to
get to grips with the fact that there is no donor
coordination mechanism for talking about the
poverty reduction strategy. I shall get fat on all the
lunches but have got as far as the “like-minded”
donors agreeing that we should formally propose
such a mechanism.
And a few weeks later:
Meanwhile, the Bolivian Government/donor
coordination group on the poverty reduction
strategy, which was my idea, has now been
formally established and has had its first meeting.
And the World Bank has accepted DFID as a
legitimate partner in the big … programme for …
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strengthening decentralisation. These are the two
things I will be mainly working on in the next
fortnight before you come … All in all, I feel very
much that I am doing the kind of things I wanted
to do and that there are lots of opportunities to
make a difference.
‘Making a difference’ was how I phrased and believed
it. I was also feeling good about myself and enjoying
the power that came with making a difference.
From these letters and notes, I find I was not
sufficiently reflecting on the impact I was having on
others, other than in triumphant mode. Thus for
example, I was proud about making my first visit
with two like-minded bilateral donor colleagues ‘to
beard the terrible IMF representative in his lair’.
… [he] was in fact rather nervous and went on
the attack. When I remarked that we [the like-
minded bilaterals] thought things were going too
fast here for achieving a participatory process in
formulating the PRSP8 … said that IMF was not
putting on the pressure but rather the UK
Government [was] and he could show me a
speech made last week by Gordon Brown to this
effect. He said he had no objections to a
donor/government working group on the PRSP
but he didn’t see any purpose on being part of
this (our suggestion) because he knew nothing
about poverty (bit unfortunate that he represents
IMF in Bolivia!)
This pride in my own power as a mover and shaker is
reflected in a subsequent independent evaluation of
DFID’s programme in Bolivia that observed that:
Since 2000, DFID has accorded high priority to
improving donor coordination and harmonisation.
DFID has been a very active player in the donor
community, a key participant in government–
donor working groups and has often taken a
leadership role. It played a particularly important
role in the 2000 dialogue and in influencing the
donor community around the PRS. 
(Flint et al. 2005: 34)
However, a footnote on the same page noted that
one informant said that DFID had ‘whipped the
donors into a consensus’.
As part of the effort to make a difference, DFID
moved out of its cramped space in the British Embassy
into new offices where we had a very large meeting
room with magnificent views over La Paz and the
snow-capped Andean peak of Illimani. Here we were
able to organise many coordination meetings with
donors and consultations with civil society. The quality
of the meeting room was far superior to that most
donor and any Bolivian government offices could offer,
let alone NGOs. Only very recently, when someone in
IDS commented to me about how disempowered she
had felt as a government official in visiting donors’
offices in her own country, did I realise that our
meeting room in La Paz might have had the same
unfortunate effect.9 Whereas the room’s purpose was
to influence and impress other donor agencies,10 I had
largely failed to consider the unintended consequences
of its symbolic impact on Bolivian government officials,
let alone NGOs. One justification for the expense of
the room had been to make it available free of charge
to Bolivian civil society for their own autonomous
meetings but during my time, this offer was only once
accepted, interestingly by a newly formed campaigning
association of people testing HIV positive.
I used the meeting room to rally those in the
donor community with a shared interest and
commitment to a rights-based approach to
development, primarily challenging the perspective
of the IFIs. In Bourdieu’s terms, I was using
symbolic capital to contest the IFI orthodoxy that
perceived aid as an economic contract between
freely choosing actors. In understanding aid as a
right, I saw its potential as a catalyst for social
transformation in Bolivia, encouraging citizens to
make political demands on their government to
spend the public budget (including the aid
component) to respond to their interests, rather
than just the interests of the small ruling elite. Yet,
while I encouraged a different way of thinking
about aid among those I met in Bolivia, at the
same time I decided not to think too much as to
whether aid by its very nature of being an
unreciprocated gift could achieve such a
transformation. As Shutt remarks in this IDS
Bulletin, whether one’s actions from a position of
power to support empowerment are interpreted
as helpful and creating power to or trying to gain
control is highly subjective and is shaped by the
beliefs and values of those one is seeking to help.
From the perspective of ordinary Bolivian citizens in a
society where livelihoods and welfare significantly
depended on securing a good patron, our new offices
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were seen as an opportunity for enhanced access to
such a patron. One reason for moving out of the
embassy had been to minimise security arrangements,
so that Bolivian civil society representatives could visit
the DFID office easily with no sense of harassment.
What I had not anticipated were the regular
unsolicited visits from rural community leaders
requesting small gifts for local projects, such as a
school building or a micro-dam. DFID’s focus on using
aid as an instrument to change policy meant that
with some considerable embarrassment, we gave
instructions to our receptionist to send these people
away and across the street to the British Embassy,
where there was a ‘small gifts scheme’ – but because
of the forbidding nature of the building’s security
system they would never dare enter.
Observing the operations of power through the eyes
of potential recipients requires an imaginative effort
that perhaps most donor staff are rarely encouraged
or able to take. Some two years after leaving DFID, I
visited Peru. I went with two members from an IDS
partner organisation to the offices of another
bilateral agency in Lima, in search of funds for the
continuation of their work. We deliberately did not
introduce me as a former aid official. Empathising
with the two Peruvians – with whom I had
rehearsed this meeting, I felt very nervous. My heart
beat fast and my mouth was dry. Carlos from the
partner organisation started to explain the
organisation’s work and was interrupted by the
official’s secretary coming into the room with a
message. She left and Carlos tried to continue. But
the official, without even an apology, then called her
back into the room and told her ‘to let me know
when he is free and I will go to him’. Once again, he
did not apologise for the interruption and poor
Carlos had to pick up what he was saying for a
second time. Observing the official, who appeared a
pleasant enough man, I realised he had no idea
whatsoever of the impact he was making, nor of the
significance of the meeting to the visitors.
How do these post-DFID reflections help me interpret
the operation of the new aid modalities in Bolivia?
3.2 The new aid modalities in Bolivia
While I was working in Bolivia the country was
becoming increasingly disturbed by waves of conflict
between different sections of the population and the
government (Crabtree 2005). Yet, at the beginning of
the decade, the international aid system still saw Bolivia
as one of its successes, piloting country-led approaches,
basket funding, sector-wide approaches and
coordinating aid in support of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy. At the time, I was convinced of the
progressive nature of such instruments. Putting money
in the government’s budget would strengthen the
capacity of aid to become an entitlement; it would also
contribute to dismantling the patronage system in
Bolivia by refusing to give aid directly to the citizens
through NGO projects but instead encouraging them
to hold their state institutions accountable for the
delivery of services to which they were entitled.
On this basis, I recommended that DFID, with some
other bilaterals, co-finance through grant aid, a
World Bank instrument – Programme Structural
Adjustment Credit (PSAC) – that had been initially
designed to refinance heavily indebted municipal
authorities. We decided to join in because it seemed
an excellent opportunity to influence the World
Bank and the Government of Bolivia at the same
time. The aim had been to work ‘on both sides of
the equation’.11 A parallel project supporting civil
society strengthening to hold the government
accountable for progress on decentralisation was
designed by DFID but never implemented through
lack of interest by other donors to support it, and
the discouragement from the Ministry of Finance
that saw ‘donor driven’ projects as an infringement
of its entitlement to all aid from donor governments
going to itself rather than to groups outside
government (Eyben with León 2005).
For World Bank task managers, the PSAC’s narrow
purpose was to refinance local government so it did
not collapse and the bilateral ideas concerning this aid
instrument for promoting rights, gender equality,
greater citizen participation and social inclusion,
frankly seemed to baffle them. Within government
circles, equally conflicting ideas were in evidence as to
the purpose of the PSAC. For the Ministry of Finance
facing a cash liquidity problem, the main concern was
simply to get some money by any means, as I wrote
in an email to my partner when DFID was also
considering the possibility of providing some other
budgetary support in addition to the PSAC:
… the most fun I have had this week is working
on DFID providing emergency budgetary support
to Bolivia … I have been negotiating this through
the Ministry of Finance. Doing it all in Spanish
makes it even more of an amusing challenge. The
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background to this has been that Clare Short12 has
said she wants to help Bolivia if they need it and I
discovered that they have a $20 million hole in
their recurrent budget for this month and if they
borrow or print money they go off-track.
Meanwhile, although the Ministry of Finance was
seeking to negotiate the PSAC as quickly as possible,
other parts of government could not agree as to the
policy conditions required by the Bank, let alone
those more ambitious objectives of the bilaterals.
Heated discussions took place between different
sections of the government concerning the powers
of local government; the agony dragged out for
several more months before the cabinet of ministers
could agree to a policy statement on decentralisation
that the Bank saw as a minimum precondition for
releasing the loan.
During this time, I was writing to my partner that:
… the decentralisation programme the Bank has
been working on and to which we have
provisionally committed $10million in co-financing
is now being pushed through the final appraisal
and negotiation stages at breakneck speed (just
because no new IDA [International Development
Association] money has been disbursed this year
which is one of the reasons for Bolivia being short
of money) and the wrap up is in Washington in
the week of 18th December. This trip I can’t
wriggle out of – highly inconvenient but I am
trying to get flights from here to Washington and
then directly to London to arrive on the morning
of the 22nd as previously planned.
An evaluation of PSAC (Helmsing et al. 2003) points
out that although the ‘social’ issues which were the
bilaterals’ concern were eventually included in the
loan, there was no provision for ensuring these
concerns were addressed at implementation. It was
certainly not this particular aid instrument that
contributed to the strengthened voice of the
indigenous majority but organised political
movements that challenged the ruling elite and
eventually came to power through the elections at
the end of 2005.
Some commentators saw our ‘disproportionate’
insistence on ‘social’, as distinct from financial issues
as a sign of over-interference. ‘Ownership’ is fine in
seminars, but in practice …’ (ibid.: 49) On the other
hand, the evaluation notes that of the total funds
provided only 50 per cent went to the government
agencies and authorities designated to receive them
in accordance with the PSAC terms and conditions
(ibid.: 14). The rest of the money disappeared into the
general coffers of the state and the evaluation of
DFID concludes that this was not a successful
initiative. The PSAC was an instrument that ignored
the World Bank’s own findings that Bolivia’s political
system was patrimonial and clientelist, judging this as
the principal cause of poor public sector
performance and lack of responsiveness to poor
people’s needs and demands (World Bank 2000).
PSAC was an example of what two other World
Bank analysts have described as ‘skipping straight to
Weber’, meaning that donors pretend to themselves
that with some technical assistance and the financial
incentives offered by aid, state institutions in a
country such as Bolivia can be rapidly converted into
an ideal impartial and incorruptible bureaucracy
(Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).
From the perspective of the World Bank country
representative, PSAC was part of a political agenda
which would allow his agency to be the lead donor
harmonising the efforts of the rest of the aid
community. It was his aim to make this the
forerunner of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit
(PRSC) where his head office would expect its
country representative to play a strong role in lining
up all the donors behind its leadership.
PSAC was an instrument that gave me personal
satisfaction. It supported my ideal of what state–
citizen relations should be; it involved managing large
sums of money and having one-to-one negotiations
with the Minister of Finance; it provided the
opportunity to be in there with the big boys with
high-powered missions to Washington where,
watched by my like-minded colleagues on a video
link that connected La Paz with the World Bank
headquarters, I convinced the regional vice-president
that the social issues had to be included.
On the other hand, in terms of aid effectiveness, the
evaluation of DFID’s programme cited earlier
concluded it was the support given to civil society
through our small strategic impact fund that proved to
be the most effective aid in terms of impact, for
example to a network of organisations, known as the
Comité Enlacé where DFID’s support ‘was described
as open, process-orientated, non-imposed,
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empowering and participatory’ (Flint et al. 2005: 20).
Yet, such support was clearly seen as a gift by both
donor and recipient – one in which I as the donor
representative had considerable influence, for example
when I informed the network that DFID would
withdraw financial support should its leader stand as a
political party candidate in the 2002 elections. I and
my colleagues were also influential in our choice of
whom to support in civil society. It was discretionary
and it meant that some groups had more access to
money than others.13 Although informed by political
analysis and good intentions, it was patronage
nevertheless. We never ran any kind of challenge fund
programme to which all civil society organisations
could apply. In the one instance I did consider doing so,
Bolivian colleagues advised me against it, arguing (I
believe correctly) that such a competitive fund could
risk breaking up delicately balanced coalitions
That aid is discretionary, not subject to legally binding
contracts, became apparent to DFID and the
Bolivian Government in late 2003. Following the
invasion of Iraq and the resulting budgetary demands
on the aid programme, London decided in
November 2003 to cut back sharply and rapidly on
its financing of other middle-income countries,
including Bolivia, so as to still meet its commitment
to raising the percentage of bilateral spending on
low-income countries to 90 per cent by 2005/6.
With some other donors, DFID had been involved in
several basket fund arrangements in addition to
PSAC. One was support to a national agricultural
research programme, known as SIBTA. As the DFID
representative, and at the suggestion of the Dutch,
along with the other bilateral donors I signed a
contract with the government in accordance with
international civil contract conventions established at
The Hague. When DFID at the end of 2003 took
the unilateral decision to cut its support by
£2.1 million, one of the other donor representatives
suggested to the Bolivians that they take the case to
The Hague and sue DFID for breach of contract. My
informant concluded that the government decided
not to do so because of the damage it would cause
to relations between the two governments.14 The
independent evaluation concludes however, that
these cuts were damaging to DFID’s reputation:
The fact that DFID raised so many expectations
and built so many close working relationships has
made its sudden decision to reduce its bilateral
programme even more of a disappointment. This
experience is bound to make some partners more
sceptical of DFID’s long-term commitment to
Bolivia, the region and the particular issues that it
has championed so effectively since 2000.
(Flint et al. 2005: 17)
Thus, although through adopting the new aid
modalities, DFID appeared to be switching away
from practising aid as a gift, ultimately its behaviour
revealed that this was not the case. It was seen as a
badly behaving, capricious giver – revealing the
shadow side of the gift relationship – and
undermining the relations of solidarity and potential
long-term support that is the positive aspect of the
gift. To be effective, contracts and entitlements need
the force of law. Gifts, on the other hand, require
shared values and a moral commitment to the
relationship, something that DFID did not recognise
in its enthusiasm for the contractual forms that
accompanied the new ways of doing aid.
As a final note, even the Bank broke its own
contractual procedures by subsequently paying out a
further instalment of the PSAC despite policy
benchmarks largely not having been met. I was told
that it did this under pressure from the US
Government, worried that Bolivia’s deepening
financial crisis would lead to political disturbances,
which would have a ripple effect throughout the
region and damage US interests.15
4 Conclusion
In this article, I have tried to identify some of the
reasons why the new aid modalities are attractive to
both donors and recipients. I have suggested that for
both parties these modalities represent modernity
and thus at first sight reduce the dissonance between
the kinds of aid instrument and its goals. Budget
support merges a bilateral donor’s grant with an IFI’s
loan – thus conceptualising it as an impersonal market
transaction. For recipient governments, such as in
Bolivia, the emphasis on country-led approaches
provides the opportunity to see aid as an entitlement
with a growing emphasis on two-way accountability
rather than simply one way back to donors.
In addition to this apparent resolution of dissonance
between instruments and the favoured theory of aid
as either contract or entitlement, for donors there is
the attractiveness of policy-based lending/grants
involving much larger sums of money than traditional
projects and therefore (in a simplistic input–output
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logic) likely to deliver bigger results. From a more
personal perspective, while some staff in bilateral
agencies might feel their individual contribution to a
basket fund initiative might not be noticed (Nickson
2002), my own experience was that the policy
dialogue associated with the new aid modalities gave
me a seductive buzz (a sensation of power) that
working on the tedious implementation details of
little bilateral projects quite often failed to do. From
conversations with a number of DFID social
development advisers, I have the impression that this
is not an uncommon sensation.
Yet, for the time being at least, there is not a great
deal of evidence in the ignored reality of everyday
practice that aid has stopped being a gift, whatever
claims might be made to the contrary. The recent
accusations by African governments concerning the
failure of donors to meet their commitments made
in 2005 at Gleneagles are an illustration of aid’s
continued discretionary nature. If aid as a gift were
to be ‘outed’, how would that change the nature of
power in the relationship? Navarro argues in this IDS
Bulletin that the uncovering of the misrecognition
constructed by power provides the opportunity for
emancipation. At the very least, it would offer the
possibility of putting aid relationships on a more
honest and critically reflective footing. It would
recognise that there is both a positive and shadow
side of the aid relationship. To make a charitable gift
represents affection, caring and responsibility but it is
also about power, violence and aggression (Amariglio
2002). Nevertheless, although the giving and
receiving of gifts expresses hatred and resentment as
well as love and friendship, I agree with the
argument that a gift can be sufficiently noble to
overcome its shadow side (Caillé 2000).
Finally, the gift privileges relationship building. I have
argued elsewhere that the quality of relationships
within and between organisations in the web of aid
is crucial for long-term effectiveness. What are now
considered old-fashioned reasons for aid – for
example the idea of ‘solidarity’ that used to underpin
Swedish aid – recognised the importance of
relationships and did not perceive them as an
unfortunate ‘transaction cost’.
I therefore conclude that the power of the gift can
enable international aid to support the achievement
of social justice and poverty reduction provided that
those in the world of aid recognise their practices
for what they are and thus by making it visible learn
to better manage the shadow side and promote the
positive aspects of a socially embedded relationship,
which is what a gift expresses.
IDS Bulletin Volume 37  Number 6  November 2006 97
Notes
* I am most grateful to Katy Gardner, as well as to
Colette Harris and Cathy Shutt for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article.
1 The emphasis on mutual accountability in the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is however
more geared towards a contractual understanding
of aid where the primary aim is efficiency (OECD
2005).
2 See Ch. 9 in Crewe and Harrison (1998).
3 In a presentation at a conference on
‘Development People’ held at Queen Elisabeth
House, 31 March–1 April 2006.
4 See Navarro in this IDS Bulletin on the topic of
‘misrecognition’.
5 See Riddell (1987) for a discussion of these
debates.
6 Jean-Philippe Therien (2002) argues that the
right tends to see aid as charity, but I would
suggest that this relates to personal individual
giving from a rich person to a poor person
through the voluntary sector, typified by the
child-sponsorship NGOs. In terms of public sector
transfers, the case for aid is either economic
(future markets) or political (the furtherance of a
country’s self interest).
7 See my analysis in Eyben with León (2005).
8 Poverty Reduction Strategy paper. Bolivia was one
of the first highly indebted countries to prepare a
PRSP that was endorsed by the World Bank and
the IMF in July 2001.
9 Personal communication from Nancy Okail
(2006).
10 One observer interviewed for the independent
evaluation remarked that ‘DFID has had more
influence per dollar than any other donor in
Bolivia’ (Flint et al. 2005: 2).
11 A phrase coined by John Gaventa, with which I
became familiar later.
12 The UK Secretary of State for International
Development (1997–2003)
13 See also Wilson and Eyben (2006).
14 Personal communication from one of those
present at a meeting in La Paz in late 2003.
15 Personal communication from another informant
(2005).
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